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• Very dangerous:  Injection Attacks.
• Introduction to automated assessment 
tools. 
• The SWAMP.





• Understand the general problem of 
injections.
• Understand what are SQL injections, and 
how to mitigate them.
• Understand what are Command injections, 
and how to mitigate them.
Injection Attacks
• Description
– A string constructed with user input, that is then 
interpreted by another function, where the string is not 
parsed as expected
• Command injection (in a shell)
• Format string attacks (in printf/scanf)
• SQL injection
• Cross-site scripting or XSS (in HTML)
• General causes
– Allowing metacharacters




• User supplied values used in SQL 
command must be validated, quoted, or 
prepared statements must be used
• Signs of vulnerability
– Uses a database mgmt system (DBMS)
– Creates SQL statements at run-time





• Dynamically generated SQL without 
validation or quoting is vulnerable
$u = " '; drop table t --";
$sth = $dbh->do("select * from t where u = '$u'");
Database sees two statements:
select * from t where u = ' '; drop table t --'
• Use prepared statements to mitigate
$sth = $dbh->do("select * from t where u = ?", $u);
– SQL statement template and value sent to 
database
– No mismatch between intention and use
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Successful SQL Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd)  {
boolean loggedIn = false;
conn = pool.getConnection( );
stmt = conn.createStatement();
rs = stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM members"
+ "WHERE u='" + user





4. System grants access Login() returns true
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SELECT * FROM members 
WHERE u='admin' AND p='' OR 'x'='x'
2. DB Queried
3. Returns all row of table members
Mitigated SQL Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd)  {
boolean loggedIn = false;
conn = pool.getConnection( );
PreparedStatement pstmt = conn.prepareStatement(
"SELECT * FROM members WHERE u = ? AND p = ?");
pstmt.setString( 1, user);
pstmt.setString( 2, pwd);




user="admin"; pwd="' OR 'x'='x"
4. System does not grant access Login() returns false
SELECT * FROM members WHERE u = ?1 AND p = ?2
?1 = "admin" ?2 = "' OR 'x'='x"




• User supplied data used to create a string 
that is the interpreted by command shell such 
as /bin/sh
• Signs of vulnerability
– Use of popen, or system
– exec of a shell such as sh, or csh
– Argument injections, allowing arguments to begin 
with "-" can be dangerous
• Usually done to start another program
– That has no C API
– Out of laziness
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Command Injection Mitigations
• Check user input for metacharacters
• Neutralize those that can’t be eliminated or 
rejected
– replace single quotes with the four characters, '\'', 
and enclose each argument in single quotes
• Use fork, drop privileges and exec for more 
control
• Avoid if at all possible
• Use C API if possible
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Command Argument Injections
• A string formed from user supplied input 
that is used as a command line argument  
to another executable
• Does not attack shell, attacks command line of 
program started by shell
• Need to fully understand command line 
interface
• If value should not be an option
– Make sure it doesn't start with a -





– Filename is a tiny language besides opening
• Open files in various modes
• Can start programs
•dup file descriptors
– If $filename is "rm -rf /|", you probably 
won’t like the result





• Vulnerable to shell interpretation
open(C, "$cmd|") open(C, "-|", $cmd)
open(C, "|$cmd") open(C, "|-", $cmd)
`$cmd` qx/$cmd/
system($cmd)





Perl Command Injection 
Examples
• open(CMD, "|/bin/mail -s $sub $to");
– Bad if $to is "badguy@evil.com; rm -rf /"
• open(CMD, “|/bin/mail -s '$sub' '$to'");
– Bad if $to is "badguy@evil.com'; rm -rf /'"
• ($qSub = $sub) =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
($qTo = $to)   =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
open(CMD, "|/bin/mail -s '$qSub' '$qTo'");
– Safe from command injection
• open(cmd, "|-", "/bin/mail", "-s", $sub, $to);
– Safe and simpler: use this whenever possible.
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Eval Injections
• A string formed from user supplied input that is 
used as an argument that is interpreted by the 
language running the code
• Usually allowed in scripting languages such as 
Perl, sh and SQL
• In Perl eval($s) and s/$pat/$replace/ee




Functions prone to injection attacks:
• Kernel.system(os command)
• Kernel.exec(os command)







Functions prone to injection attacks:
• exec() # dynamic execution of Python code
• eval() # returns the value of an expression or    
#  code object
• os.system() # execute a command in a subshell
• os.popen() # open a pipe to/from a command
• execfile() # reads & executes Python script from 
# a file.
• input() # equivalent to eval(raw_input())
• compile() # compile the source string into a code 
#  object that can be executed
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Successful OS Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
3. System executes nslookup x.com;rm –rf /*
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String rDomainName(String hostname)  {
…
String cmd = "/usr/bin/nslookup " + hostname;
Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
…
hostname="x.com;rm –rf /*"
2. Application uses nslookup to get DNS records
4. All files possible are deleted
Mitigated OS Injection Attack
3. System returns error "Invalid host name"
21
String rDomainName(String hostname)  {
…
if (hostname.matches("[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9.-]*")) {
String cmd = "/usr/bin/nslookup " + hostname);




1. User sends malicious data
hostname="x.com;rm –rf /*"
2. Application uses nslookup only if input validates
Code Injection
Cause
– Program generates source code from template
– User supplied data is injected in template
– Failure to neutralized user supplied data
• Proper quoting or escaping
• Only allowing expected data
– Source code compiled and executed
Very dangerous – high consequences for 






print PH "import LogIt\n";w
while (($k, $v) = (each %data)) {
if ($k eq 'name')  {
print PH "LogIt.Name('$v')";
}
2. Perl log processing code – uses Python to do real work
name = John Smith
name = ');import os;os.system('evilprog');#














print PH "import LogIt\n";w
while (($k, $v) = (each %data)) {




2. Perl log processing code – use QuotePyString to safely create string literal
name = John Smith
name = ');import os;os.system('evilprog');#




3. Python source executed – 2nd LogIt is now safe
sub QuotePyString {
my $s = shift;
$s =~ s/\\/\\\\/g;   # \  \\
$s =~ s/\n/\\n/g;    # NL  \n







1. What You Need to 
Know about How Tools 
Work
2. The Tools And Their 
Use
Source Code Analysis Tools
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (her, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVR)
{







return ((struct table *) 0);
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A Bit of History
Compiler warnings
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A Bit of History
• Lint  (1979)
– C program checker.
– Detects suspicious constructs:
• Variables being used before being set.
• Division by zero.
• Conditions that are constant.
• Calculations whose result is likely to overflow.
• Current automated assessment tools are 
a sort of “super-Lint”.
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Source Code Analysis Tools
• Designed to analyze source code or 
binaries to help find security flaws.
• The source code may contain inadvertent 
or deliberate weaknesses that could lead 
to security vulnerabilities in the 
executable versions of the application 
program.
• Better to use them from the beginning of 
the software development life cycle.
– Though commonly applied to legacy code.
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Source Code Analysis Tools
• Program that parses and then analyses 
the source code.
• Doesn’t know what the program is 
supposed to do.
• Looks for violations of good programming 
practices.
• Looks for specific programming errors.
• Works like a compiler
– Instead of binaries, it produces an 
intermediate representation 
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Source Code Analysis Tools






Different kind of tools:









Source Code Analysis Tools
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Different kind of tools
execl (cmd, NULL);  
Pattern (syntax) matching
Semantic analysis





Different kind of tools
execl (cmd, NULL);  
Pattern (syntax) matching
Semantic analysis









Different kind of tools




Source Code Analysis Tools
How do they work
Identify the code to be analyzed.
– Scripts or build systems that build the 
executable.
The parser interprets the source code in 
the same way that a compiler does.
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Source Code Analysis Tools
How do they work
Each invocation of the tool creates a model 
of the program:
– Abstract representations of the source
• Control-flow graph
• Call graph
• Information about symbols (variables and type 
names)
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Source Code Analysis Tools
How do they work
Symbolic execution on the model:
– Abstract values for variables.
– Explores paths.
– Based on abstract interpretation and model 
checking.
– The analysis is path sensitive.
• The tool can tell the path for the flow to appear.
• Points along that path where relevant 
transformations occur and conditions on the data 
values that must hold.
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Source Code Analysis Tools
How do they work
The tool issue a set of warnings.
– List with priority levels.
The user goes through the warning list and 





Source Code Analysis Tools 
The Output
A tool grades weaknesses according things 
such as
severity,
potential for exploit, or





Source Code Analysis Tools
The Output
Ultimately people must analyze the tool’s 
report and the code then decide: 
– Which reported items are not true 
weaknesses. 
– Which items are acceptable risks and will not 
be mitigated.
– Which items to mitigate, and how to mitigate 
them. 
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No single tool can find every possible 
weaknesses:
– A weakness may result in a vulnerability in one 
environment but not in another.
– No algorithm can correctly decide in every case 
whether or not a piece of code has a property, 
such as a weakness.
– Practical analysis algorithms have limits because 
of performance, approximations, and intellectual 
investment.
– And new exploits are invented and new 
vulnerabilities discovered all the time!
Source Code Analysis Tool 
Limitations
43
Source Code Analysis Tools
What can they find








Source Code Analysis Tools
What is difficult to find
• Authentication problems.
– Ex: Use of non-robust passwords.
• Access control issues.
– Ex: ACL that does not implement the principle 
of least privilege.
• Insecure use of cryptography.
– Ex:  Use of a weak key.
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Source Code Analysis Tools
What is not possible to find
• Incorrect design.
• Code that incorrectly implements the 
design.
• Configuration issues, since they are not 
represented in the code.




– Analyze code structure and build a graph 
representation.
– Basics blocks and branch/call edges.
– Pointers are difficult.
Data flow analysis
– Usage, calculation, and setting of variables.
– Extract symbolic expressions.
– Arrays are annoying.





Detects control flow dependencies among 
different instructions.
Control Flow Graph (CFG)
– Abstract representation of the source code.
– Each node represents a basic block.
– Call or jump targets start a basic block.
– Jumps end a basic block.
– Directed edges represent the control flow.
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int Find(char *pat, char *buf,
unsigned int plen,




while (i <= (blen - plen)) {
p = &buf[i];
j = 0;
while (j < plen) {




if (j >= plen) return i;
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int Find(char *pat, char *buf,
unsigned int plen,
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p = &buf[i];
j = 0;
while (j < plen) {
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if (*p != pat[j])









Goal:  Is this code safe?
Subgoal: 
Do we violate the borders of buf and pat?
• Simple dependences
• Flow insensitivity








• Loop carried 
dependences
• Need to understand the 
values for i to know that 
references to buf[i] are 
safe.
• Same for j and pat[j].
i=0
if i <= (blen-plen)
if (*p != pat[j])










• Similar to the data flow 
analysis on the previous 
slide.
• Goal is to answer the 
question: where does p
point? Are the 
references safe?
• On what variables is p’s 
value based?
• Of course, to calculate 
p’s value, we also have to 
know i’s value.
i=0
if i <= (blen-plen)
if (*p != pat[j])










• Similar to the data flow 
analysis on the previous 
slide.
• Goal is to answer the 
question: where does p
point? Are the 
references safe?
• On what variables is p’s 
value based?
• Of course, to calculate 
p’s value, we also have to 
know i’s value.
i=0
if i <= (blen-plen)
if (*p != pat[j])










• Note that there are two 
completely different 
ways to name the same 
memory locations.
• Understand these 
aliases can be important 
to understanding how 
memory is being 
referenced.
i=0
if i <= (blen-plen)
if (*p != pat[j])








int Find(char *pat, char *buf,
unsigned int plen,




while (i <= (blen - plen)) {
p = &buf[i];
j = 0; 
while (j < plen) {





















The goal is to understand 
the range of  values for 
each variable:
Semantic Analysis
And this was a pretty 
simple example. It had no






These make program 




if i <= (blen-plen)
if (*p != pat[j])








Source Code Analysis Tools.
What is expensive to find
It’s difficult for a tool to explore all the 
paths.
– Loops handled considering a small fixed 
number of iterations.
– Most tools ignore concurrency.
– Many tools ignore recursive calls.
– Many tools struggle with calls made through 
function pointers.
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• “CWE provides a unified, measurable set 
of software weaknesses”. 
• “Allows a more effective use of software 
security tools”.
• 719 weaknesses in 244 categories.
• Id, description, consequences, examples, 
relationship, taxonomy mapping.
http://cwe.mitre.org/




1. What You Need to 
Know about How Tools 
Work




• Source code example
• Tools for Java applied to the source code
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What and Why
• Learn about different automated tools for 
vulnerability assessment.
• Start with small programs with 
weaknesses.
• Apply  different tools to the programs.
• Understand the output, and the strong 
and weak points of using specific tools.
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Descriptive name of weakness (CWE XX)
An intuitive summary of the weakness.
– Attack point: How does the attacker affect the 
program.
– Impact point: Where in the program does the 
bad thing actually happen.
– Mitigation: A version of the program that does 
not contain the weakness.
(CWEXX_Long_Detailed_File_Name_Containg_The_Code_yy.cpp)
How to Describe a Weakness
74
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CWE 601: Open Redirect
public void doGet(HttpServletRequest request,
1. HttpServletResponse response)
2. throws ServletException, IOException {
3. response.setContentType("text/html");






10. data = ""; // initialize data in case there are no cookies.
11. // Read data from cookies.
12. Cookie cookieSources[] = request.getCookies();
13. if (cookieSources != null) 
14. // POTENTIAL FLAW: Read data from the first cookie value.
15. data = cookieSources[0].getValue();
16. if (data != null) {
17. URI uri;
18. uri = new URI(data);






Open Redirect (CWE 601)
Web app redirects user to malicious site 
chosen by an attacker.
– Attack Point: Reading data from the first
cookie using getCookies().
– Impact Point: SendRedirect() uses user
supplied data.











• Open source tool available at 
findbugs.sourceforge.net/downloads.html
• Uses static analysis to look for bugs in Java code.
• Need to be used with the FindSecurityBugs plugin.
• Installation:  Easy and fast.
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FindBugs
1. Define FINDBUGS_HOME in the 
environment.
2. Install the Find Security Bugs plugin.
3. Learn the command line instructions and 
also use the graphical interface.












• 1 irrelevant warning.








• Commercial tool available at 
http://www.parasoft.com/product/jtest/
• Automates a broad range of practices proven 
to improve development team productivity and 
software quality.
• Standalone Linux 9.5 version used.
– gui mode and command line mode.




1. Include /u/e/l/elisa/Jtest/9.5 in path.
2. Include the license.
3. Learn the command line instructions and also 
use the graphical interface.
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Jtest
1. Command line interface: $jtestcli
<options>
2. Graphic Interface: jtest&
3. Create a project and copy the .java files to 
the project/src directory.




Create the OpenRedir project.
Include servlet-api.jar in the OpenRedir project.
cp OpenRedirect.java 
~elisa/parasoft/workspace1/OpenRedir/src
• 4 issues detected:
– getCookies() returns tainted data.
– cookieSources[0].getValue() should be validated.
– 2 Open Redirect detected.
• It detects the Open Redirect for both the 









• What is the SWAMP?
• Using the SWAMP
– Register
– Create a project
– Upload your software package
– Run your assessment
– View the results
https://www.swampinabox.org/doc/SWAMP-User-Manual.pdf
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Getting Started with the SWAMP
• Software Assurance Market Place.
• Objective: Automate and simplify the use 
of (multiple) tools.
• A national, no-cost resource for software 
assurance (SwA) technologies used 
across research institutions, non-
governmental organizations, and civilian 
agencies and their communities as both a 
research platform and a core component 
of the software development life cycle.
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Register to use the SWAMP
94








Upload your Software Package
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Upload your Software Package
100
Upload your Software Package
101
Upload your Software Package
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View your Results. FindBugs - Native
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View your Results. FindBugs - CodeDX
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View your Results. FindBugs - CodeDX
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View your Results. FindBugs - CodeDX
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View your Results. JTest - Native
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View your Results. JTest - CodeDX
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View your Results. JTest - CodeDX
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Goals of the Assignment
• Learn to use software assessment tools 
and the SWAMP with a Java application.
• Understand the tools (and SWAMP) 
output:
– Understand the interface.
– Learn to locate in the source files the 
problems the tools are reporting security-
wise.
– Interpret the results.
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Steps we’ll go through
1. Introduction to a sample application and 
use it.
2. Upload the software package to the 
SWAMP.
3. Run assessments with the SWAMP tools.
4. Understand the output.
5. Modify the source code to fix a problem.
3
WebGoat
• A collection of unsecure web applications 
produced by OWASP.
• Built into a framework intended for 
learning to avoid common programming 
mistakes.
• Server-side application flaws.



























(you can run the ~/server.sh script)
On your web browser run the client code:
http://localhost:8888/WebGoat
Go to Injection Flaws-> String SQL injection
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Assess WebGoat in the SWAMP




tar cvf WebGoat-Lessons-develop.tar 
WebGoat-Lessons-develop/  
On your web browser go to:
https://www.mir-swamp.org/
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Assess WebGoat in the SWAMP
When creating the MyWebGoat package in the 
SWAMP:
– Chose the WebGoat-Lessons-develop.tar file just 
created
– Select Java 8
– In “build target” type clean install
When seeing the results:
– Focus on security issues
– Focus on the SqlStringInjection.java file
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Edit & Compile WebGoat Lessons
cd ~/WebGoat/WebGoat-Lessons-develop/sql-string-
injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/plugin





(you can run the ~/compile.sh script)
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Edit & Compile WebGoat Lessons









ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery();
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WebGoat Exercise 2.  Code Injection
No need to run the assessment again.
When seeing the results:
– Focus on security issues
– Focus on the CommandInjection.java file
Options to attack the server:
– Modify the client code.
– Intercept and modify the request messages.
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On your console start OWASP ZAP, the intercepting proxy: 
cd /opt/zaproxy
./zap.sh




(you can run the ~/server.sh script)
On your web browser run the WebGoat client code:
http://localhost:8888/WebGoat




Try the lesson: Select the “lesson plan to view” and click 
“View”.
Modify that request to attack the server:
– In ZAP, you can detect a pattern in the client-
server communication (request or response), 
stop the communication, edit the contents and 
then continue it. Much like in a debugger, ZAP 
calls this ability a breakpoint.
– Your job is to:
• Define breakpoints in ZAP.
• Modify the request to inject an OS command.






In your browser go to localhost:8888/WebGoat
Go to Injection Flaws-> Command injection, choose a 
lesson plan and click on “View”.




In your browser go to localhost:8888/WebGoat
Go to Injection Flaws-> Command injection, choose a 
lesson plan and click on “View”.




Modify the request to inject an OS command:
Again, go to Injection Flaws-> Command injection, 
choose a lesson plan and click on “View”.
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Modify your request here
Click here to continue
until the next break:
One click:  Response
Click again: Will run until
the next break    
WebGoat Exercise 2





What about if we want blank spaces in the command to 
inject?  (out goal is to be able to execute rm –r)
HelpFile=AccessMatrix.help”;””ls –l”&SUBMIT=View
HelpFile=AccessMatrix.help”;””cd /;ls -la”&SUBMIT=View





Edit & Compile WebGoat Lessons
cd ~/WebGoat/WebGoat-Lessons-develop/command-
injection/src/main/java/org/owasp/webgoat/plugin





(you can run the ~/compile.sh script)
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Edit & Compile WebGoat Lessons
In CommandInjection.java:
Sanitize command in exec(WebSession s, String command)
(line 218)
cd ~/WebGoat/WebGoat-Lessons-develop
mvn clean package
cp target/plugins/*.jar ../WebGoat-7.1/webgoat-
container/src/main/webapp/plugin_lessons/ 
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